Saturday, January 18, 2014

Totally Random Thoughts on Intuition


What if...

  • Ordinary usage of the term “intuition” includes more than the extension of the term. Psychological research seems similarly permissive. 
  • And why shouldn't it be... intuition permits all that enter.
  • Naturalistic decision making (Klein 1998) shows that agents within sufficient experience in a given domain make decisions on the basis of a cognitive process other than conscious considerations of various options and the weighing of evidence and utilities. Such expert intuitions appear immediately in consciousness. 
  • Last night I had the opportunity to witness a girl do this very thing. She took tremendous delight in her ability to do so ... I couldn't have been more entertained had it happened to me.
  • The intuitions of philosophy constitute a single epistemic and psychological kind, not the sort noted in the previous paragraph. 
  • Figures... philosophers enjoy complexity.
  • Philosophers equate intuitions with beliefs. David Lewis (1983) writes, “Our ‘intuitions’ are simply opinions; our philosophical theories are the same. Some are commonsensical, some are sophisticated; some are particular, some general; some are more firmly held, some less. But they are all opinions.”
  • Some are bagels, some are parks, some are ... Oh, you get the picture. 
  • Example: S has the intuition that p if and only if S believes that p.
  • Soph thinks that this is funny because Soph believes this is funny.
  • We might be more willing to accept the immediate conscious thoughts (first thoughts, gut reactions) based on ontological parsimonies (KISS or Ockham’s Razor). This indicates a close relationship between the thoughts we consider intuitions and the thoughts we call beliefs. 
  • A thought is like making a friend on the playground, he or she was there first. I remember hearing or expressing this without thinking of the significance of that other than its natural development and my recognition of it. 
  • The belief that p is neither necessary nor sufficient for intuition that p is suggested by conflicts between a person’s beliefs and their intuitions suggests that one can reason one’s way to a satisfactory resolution of a paradox and identified the false proposition, but still holds the intuition of the rejected proposition as true or possibly true, thus plausible or possible by nature. 
  • This only happens if one holds beliefs. I am not burdened by beliefs, so the notion is moot. In other words, I give not a hoot.
  • A variation of this theme is having an intuition that p is while simultaneously rationalizing that p is potentially false or even false. This means that one can have an intuition about the validity of p while simultaneously rationalizing it as false. The thought that follows this, either an acceptance based on uncertainty or the rejection based on evidence, is one belonging to one’s ability to choose the highest probable truth, according to the individual’s subjective perception of reality. 
  • Soph has the intuition of an experience while simultaneously rationalizing that her intuition of this experience is potentially false or even false. Soph cares and does not care about the validity of the experience she intuits and would not rationalize something as false as to make such a claim is to claim that Soph knows, and Soph knows that what she knows she knows and what she does not know she does not know. The thoughts that follow this are mostly about cake and gardens and poetry and philosophical musings and children and baby animals frolicking in the sun at a picnic overlooking a lake lying under a tree on a blanket, surrounded by friends and niceties of all imaginary sorts. This is the highest truth and it is for Soph her own subjective perception of reality, which she enjoys very much. 
  • Finally, one can have a belief without an intuition, such as a belief that the ground is solid when taking a step or a belief that a fact is based on evidence, thus allowing one to consider the belief as a truth claim and thus build additional propositions and/or conclusions. In this sense, one does not have an intuition that p and so belief that p. P is not sufficient for intuition that p. 
  • This is the stuff we take for granted, like 1 + 1 = 2... it is not as much as a belief, as it is an "Okie dokie" ...
  • When viewing a Müller-Lyer illusion one might experience one line as longer than the other, even after repeatedly measuring the lines and thus believing that, according to the measurement tools, they are of equal length. 
  • If the lines do not fit in our subjective house, we exclude them. I fail to see why this is so interesting. Perhaps it is because I prefer to think about the nectar of the gods than to bore my mind with what goes on outside the grounds. Yet, if I were to dream myself into a Müller-Lyer illusion I would indeed walk around and follow the lines and count my steps and feel for myself how the lines fit together. Then on this matter I would have something to say.
  • The doubt that is cast here, favored by many psychologists and philosophers with naturalistic inclinations - myself included in the latter group - is consistent with the thought that intuitions are beliefs with a suitable etiology. (Gopnik and Schwitzgebel 1998; Devit 2006, p. 491; Kornblith 1998). 
  • Okie dokie (see above).
  • My own naturalistic inclinations are perhaps similar to those derived by so-called “physiologists,” like Thales and Anaxagoras, who attempted to explain the origins of the universe and the causes of nature. My continual reference to “energie” as a catch-all term for the multitude of energetic shapes I perceive and have been experimenting with since early childhood arise from this inclination.
  • Water, air, breath, fire, infinite, energie... stuff, God, Allah, Buddha, Krishna... sounds like the making of an indy joke.
  • Soph has the intuition that energie is and can be interpreted as a language or map if and only if Soph forms the occurrent belief that energie exists and can be interpreted as a language or map without consciously inferring it from some other belief. 
  • What Soph said (see above).
  • Or in general terms, S has the intuition that p if and only if S forms the occurrent belief that p without consciously inferring it from some other belief. 
  • Yup.
  • Beliefs with an inferential origin of which a person is conscious are not intuitions. While one might argue that an agent can confuse intuition with a non-inferential perceptual belief, memory belief or introspective belief, those supporting beliefs can still be put to the test by re-examining those beliefs following a new intuitive moment. 
  • 1 + 1 = 2. Check √
  • Rather than believing in an intuition it is possible to hold an intuition as a possible truth claim. In the absence of further etiological restrictions or confirmations, one might employ a skeptical position in that one cannot know from within the system it examines (i.e., the universe or itself). This leaves room for p and not p to coexist. This approach requires reexamination in the face of all new intuitions or information pertaining to a prior intuition and would be exhausting for the less inquisitive mind. 
  • In the absence of further etiological restrictions or confirmations, one might ENJOY the thought and leave skepticism for those who fiddle around with beliefs. Acknowledging something that is is not the same as believing that acknowledgment is anything other than what it is. If told or shown otherwise, the process begins anew. This leaves room for everyone to exist and not exist at the same time. True, it does require reexamination of related thoughts and sensations, but that is the fun in it. Gives us something to do. I recommend plenty of caffeine, sweets, salty foods, loads of water, daily exercise, philosophical ruminations, fanciful imaginings, good company, loving thoughts, suitors, children and little animals, and things to play with or create other things. These things make great props and lovely contributions to living while one dedicates their mind to the aforementioned ruminations. Feel free to substitute everything in this list for stuff you prefer. 
  • (Ludwig, 2007) S has the intuition that p if and only if S forms the occurrent belief that p solely on the basis of competence with the concepts involved in p. 
  • Competence comes from reevaluating things every time new information is presented. Hence the need for caffeine and sweets. This requires a lot of physical energie. Soph is now smiling as her mind combines those two concepts: physical + energie.
  • Recognizably direct introspective judgments regarding intuition are difficult to justify as agents might lack direct introspective access to the non-conscious causes of one’s beliefs. If, however, the existence of p is (i.e., intuitions and non-conscious thoughts) have an etiological origin in the natural energetic material from which matter arises and takes form, then it might be possible to gain a form of access via perception (similar in domain to intuition) from which a clearer pathway might be recognized. 
  • Don't worry if this happens. It is not a big deal. If it becomes a big deal, artefacts of this processing failure will appear in multiple areas of your life, which you'll naturally attend, though perhaps not with the same cheerful attitude you might have had while drinking caffeine, eating sweets, and enjoying your garden to the utmost. My recommendation is to get through it as efficiently as possible, smile along the way (for no reason other than it feels better than not smiling), and celebrate once you've completed each task. 
  • Peter van Inwagen: “in some cases, the tendencies that make certain beliefs attractive to us, that ‘move’ us in the direction of accepting certain propositions without taking us all the way to acceptance (1997, p. 309). This suggests S has the intuition that p if and only if S is disposed to believe p. This disposition to believe is a propositional attitude similar to what might arise after deriving multiple similar conclusionary possibilities following intuitive moments or insights. 
  • This makes perfect sense. It is, at least for me, how my mind processes sensations into thoughts.
  • While some agents might formulate and thus act in accordance with a potential or perceived belief about the validity of a given intuition, this does not indicate an automatic acceptance of that belief insomuch as it prohibits the agent from re-examination should another intuition arise that leads the agent to question either the intuition or the conclusion. 
  • Naturally, this could merely indicate that said person is experimenting with potential thoughts. Experimentation is not a belief in the experiment, it is a "What if" and a willingness to explore. Exploration isn't believing, it is playing. Playing make-believe is an entirely different thing. 
  • To believe on the basis of mere human understanding could also be argued as a belief (such as a belief in the validity of intuition or energie or p) if one holds a skeptical view on the epistemological nature of knowing. Thus, S has the intuition that p if and only if S is [philosophically] disposed to believe p merely on the basis of understanding. S may indeed simultaneously categorize this philosophical disposition as p and thus hold p and not p without conflict between the conscious and non-conscious mind insomuch as both belief and non-belief arise from belief. 
  • What else can we do? It is difficult to conceive of what is not, until we bring it into being. Once we bring it into being, we are back here. Thus, Soph has the intuition that this is true if and only if Soph is disposed to believe she recognizes herself, which one might say is a recognition of self from another self, which brings up a whole host of things we'll not get into for the sake of "brevity" -------> Now that's funny! 
  • The sui generis occurrent propositional attitude, variously characterized as one in which a proposition occurrently seems true (Bealer 1998, 2002; Pust 2000; Huemer 2001, 2005), in which a proposition is presented to the subject as true (Chudnoff 1011a), or which pushes the subject to believe a proposition (Koksvik 2011). These views are united in denying a belief that p is necessary or sufficient for an intuition that p and in rejecting dispositional analyses of intuition adopts a view or belief, either consciously or unconsciously, and thus each intuition or conscious thought cycles through this belief so that the close connection between intuition that p and disposition to believe p is explained by claiming that intuitions can serve as the ground of the disposition to believe p. Example: I sensed a break in energie and thus concluded I should look further for tangible evidence of this perceived break. If this agent does not find tangible evidence to support p (the intuition), then the agent might simultaneously believe p and not p until evidence is found, which can be considered indicative of a belief in and of itself (the continual search based on a deeply held belief) or indicative of a belief in the skeptical notion that we cannot know and thus must continually search until one can validate a truth claim as true or false. 
  • Gee wiz, this was a long one. Did anyone even bother reading this to make it worth my time to think about it? Alas, I shall think about it for the sake of beauty, for the sake of uniformity, for the sake of the thought itself and the true enjoyment I derive from thinking. Okay, here it goes... independent thinkers are cool ... visit a coffee house to witness this phenomenon.  When you arrive to said coffee house, order a beverage and find a good seat. Think about the last time you heard something TOTALLY BOGUS. That feeling you just got, right this very moment, in the pit of your stomach, this is your belief. Now, reconcile the idea that all of your ideas stem from this gut feeling. The way your mind works is the process that occurs as you ruminate, categorize, recognize, epiphanize, or otherwise convince yourself of your next thought. Now think about the thoughts you just thought. What do they have in common? Are they consistent with other thoughts? Are they different? If yes, how so? Now, ask yourself if they are really different? Presuming you have the capacity to ask the last question, you're probably thinking to yourself that they're not all that different. That should tell you something. If you don't know what I'm talking about, start anew and try again. If you do not wish to start anew, sit back and relax and enjoy your beverage. Besides, while you are sitting there kicking back, someone else is busy at work creating new styles, designed to meet our needs and subsequent pleasures many derive from these niceties. While you're hanging out at a Coffee house thinking about stuff, someone else is out there getting rich on an idea you could have had had you been busying yourself thinking about things that other people would buy. Take me for example, I could be thinking about writing a book given how many people ask me to publish. I could write in a website and charge annual subscriptions to read this sometimes delightful nonsensical musings, which are actually quite entertaining. Just ask the author, she totally agrees.... thinks for a moment, and comes to the conclusion that she does not enjoy editing or formatting or work of any nature as it is offensive to her physical system. Thus she just writes for the sheer enjoyment of doing so. She publishes for her children's future amusement when comes the day her particles disburse. She acknowledges that someday said children, you know who you are, might read this in which case she bids you a warm hello while wrapping her arms around you in our favorite ritual: the hug. She also acknowledges that the public reads some this stuff, though she doubts that few are actually reading this particular passage word-for-word. Still, if someone is, hello to you, too. She smiles and moves on.
  • There is also the interpretation or perception of an experience’s categorization. S has the intuition that p if and only if it seems to S that p. In this sense, p is how S has defined it to be categorically, with each category holding truth claims not theretofore compared or contrasted against a given intuition associated with p. If categorical, memorial, or introspective discriminations within propositional context exist, then it is not consistent with intuitions as a separate intelligence from which knowledge might be considered, interpreted, or perceived. This implies the notion of perceptual intuitions. 
  • Soph has the intuition that if she wrote a book few would sell and only if she believed more would sell would Soph bother publishing. In this sense, publishing in a blog is how Soph has been experimenting with writing styles as Soph has no particular burning preference other than to combine letters in celebratory meaning for the sheer delight of being able to do so. If a clear feeling should arise that one particular style of writing would appeal to or be enjoyed by many, Soph would be happy to make one of those books for a book is a piece of art, a leisurely stroll down a parchment or scroll... interestingly enough, Soph just imagined a scroll instead of a book and now has something fun to do today as she has decided to experiment with said presentation. 
  • Clarity is served by stipulating that the author holds the belief that multiple intelligences exist and that they are all species of a common genus, and that genus is intuition, which as a form of intelligence could indeed be measured.
  • On the notion of Clarity: As incoherent and meaningless as this post might be to others, it is an act of clarity to think about one's thinking, to openly express without impediment one's own thoughts. To shield ourselves from our thoughts is an act of treason against oneself, which for me would be an abomination of self...  and Soph likes Soph. Soph would like Soph to loose 10 pounds, but that is because Soph has a highly developed aesthetic side. 
  • Of course there is the intellectual approach, e.g., this written, albeit heuristic in nature, response. In this case, one might say that S has the intuition that p if and only if it intellectually seems to S that p. That sums it up pretty nicely, I believe.
  • I agree with myself. It does sum it up pretty nicely. Besides, what else am I to believe other than those thoughts produced by my own testimony. See The Promise.
  • All joking aside (how funny is this comment), when it comes to intellectual ruminations, they arise from wherever all thought arises, intellectualized in the brain, sensitized in the body, intuited by a sense, a prioried via natural inheritance, or otherwise manifested via some unknown and not yet considered form or system. Where thought in and of itself comes from is not known and not the focus on this response, but for distinction purposes, the explanation is offered both as an acknowledgement that our species does not consciously possess, if possession is possible, a unifying theory or additional knowledge to answer such epistemological or metaphysical questions, and must thusly draw a line between the two potentially distinct thought patterns: intellectual rationalization versus natural intuition. Whether or not the two are separate or of the same source, despite the variance in their characteristics, is unknown and thus acknowledged as such.
  • I think the above paragraph sums it up perfectly and deserves repeating: "Intellectual ruminations arise from wherever all thoughts arise, intellectualized in the brain, sensitized in the body, intuited by a sense, a prioried via natural inheritance, or otherwise manifested via some unknown and not yet considered form or system. Talk about covering all the bases! Perhaps this is as close as I get to holding a belief, for it is my belief that I covered all the bases, though I am not without the subsequent belief that there could be things I have not considered. If said time reveals further thoughts on the matter, I shall reevaluate this and synthesize new information with this. Until said time, I cannot conceive of what is not, until, like I said above, it IS.
  • Presuming rational intuitions and natural intuitions are distinct in characteristic or in nature, the possibility arises for S to have a rational intuition that p IFF it intellectually seems to S that necessarily p. 
  • Just like the girl at the cash register last night. She asked when the transaction took place, I told her about a week before Christmas. She approximated a date and chose the 20th as a starting point. Lo and behold, it was on the 20th. She got it on the first guess! Clever, clever girl who admitted to me that she could do so much more than she was doing to which I immediately and without hesitation agreed before my mind even explored a thought of what that could be as it was apparent in her ability and delight over her ability, perhaps the latter being most prominent as a sign of ability ~ at least in my mind. I wonder what impetus would be needed for her to do something that constitutes "more" in her mind. I shall think on this and see if there isn't something I might do to aide her toward that without giving her anything, which is essentially taking away from her inherent ability to do it for herself. She would recognize such a gift and not delight in it as she delights in that which she conceives and does for herself. Perhaps I shall invite her to tea for a friendly chat and if an opportunity to bring this up arises, we might discuss it and I might again have the privilege of witnessing this quality in herself, which given her mindset, will set off a chain reaction leading to her "doing something more". How nice would that be for her and who knows how many other people. I enjoy the rise of energie wherever it is found. 
  • This renders all rational intuitions overtly modal in context and, on a view of concept possession according to which possessing the concept c at t requires the ability to deploy c in thought at t, requires a level of sophistication not obviously had by the philosophical innocent who is, nonetheless, presumably capable of having a rational intuition (Pust 2000, p. 38; Ludwig 2007, p. 136). 
  • Such is life. It is how many are wired to process thought. If one wishes to think beyond this it is truly for intellectual musings as recreating the thought that allows one to create the wheel is a lot of work and not work that will necessarily yield new thought. Nevertheless, the thoughts that do arise are new for the individual thinker. Thus thinking thoughts that others have thought is indeed an act of thinking a new thought as it is new to the thinker of the thought. I like thinking new thoughts, be them wholly new or not, as they are wholly new for me. If they were thought before, I merely have an allegory for my own thought with which I can play, enhancing my own new thought with delightful tales of the new ones that follow. 
  • With respect to possibility claims it is not known whether they are part of the intuitive process or an inferential based on rational intuition. 
  • This is indeed a good question. I call these things "What ifs" ... what I do about them depends on whether I have the time or am in the mood to experiment... though I rarely EVER give away what the experiment is and admit that what gets recorded is often times a symptom of the experiment not the thought itself... what comes next is anyone's guess, including my own. 
  • In the same respect, one might say that S has the rational intuition that p IFF either [A] (1) it intellectually seems to S that p and (2) if S were to consider whether P is necessarily true, it would intellectually seem to S that necessarily p, or [B] it intellectually seems to S that necessarily p. 
  • Soph has the rational intuition that she is now tired of this exercise AND it seems to Soph that she is not alone in her thinking, though she could be wrong about that, but even if she is, she is tired of this exercise, so there you have it. Nuff said. If she were to continue, she might get into thoughts such as these: 
  • This same distinction, as described in the preceding paragraph, could also be made between philosophical inquiry versus scientific experimentation. Given that there is sufficient information available on this topic, there is no need to elaborate beyond the general inclusion. 
  • This opens up an entire discussion in the field of logic.
  • One more similar in nature modal-like distinction could be made between intellectual or natural inheritance like intuitions and physical, unconscious intuitions. Malcolm Gladwell’s pioneering book Blink offers a compelling explanation for the existence of a physical intuition, which might be connected with general intuition, as described herein. Whether a distinction can be made between physical intuitions and other types of intuitions, general or otherwise, is unknown. As with all possibilities accepted or rejected, this should possibility should be explored further. 
  • This is a hot potato. Add salt and Ketchup and I'm there!




*This post has not been edited. These are random thoughts written down and recorded in the moment directly preceding the spacetime in which they were conceived. Because there is a lot of writing here, Soph, already being reticent to publish merely because she has a distaste for editing and proofing, has decided not to go back and edit, and sends her apologies in advance if this required more "guess work" on behalf of the Reader... though admittedly, "guess work" can be fun as one does not have a specific answer and can play around with one's own thoughts while simultaneously deciding whether one cares enough to seek an answer. 










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